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DEMOCRATIC CULTURE IN AMERICA
By Joseph Gordon
As Rogers Smith articulates in his book, Civic Ideals, America is a nation that blends multiple political traditions in its civic community. Smith argues that the political elite in America create “civic myths,” or stories based upon falsehoods that combine liberal and illiberal ideals. These illiberal ideals fill in the 
blanks left in America’s liberal civic foundation. So, in a nation that conflates liberal and illiberal ideals, is it 
possible to have a commonly understood “democratic culture”? In the Inclusion of the Other, Jurgen Habermas 
argues that the rights individuals enjoy in the “private life” (liberalism), must be fought for in the “public life” 
(non-liberal republicanism). In other words, for individuals to live the life they see fit for themselves, individuals 
must speak up and have their needs and desires heard in the civic community. While Americans have competing 
understandings of what should be pursued in the private life and who should be allowed to participate in the 
American civic community, most Americans believe that their own needs and concerns should be heard and 
considered. To illustrate this, I conduct an analysis of a presidential campaign speech made by David Duke, 
a right-wing extremist and former Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard. While he does not believe that all should be 
allowed to participate in the civic community, he believes that he and his supporters should have their concerns 
heard and considered. This example demonstrates that America does have a commonly understood “democratic 
culture,” even though some believe that it should not be afforded to each equally.
2Democratic Culture in America
Introduction
Curious about the grand “American Experiment,” Alexis de Tocqueville visited the new United States to understand 
the reason for their “democratic” success. Tocqueville wrote back to his native country of France in awe. He saw 
an egalitarian society where “democracy destroys or modifies those various inequalities” that existed in British-
controlled Colonial America and continued to exist in Europe when Tocqueville wrote Democracy in America.1 
From a shared conception of liberal ideals, the United States demonstrated the possibilities of Enlightenment 
thought that European nations should emulate. 
Tocquevillian doctrine, later expanded upon by Louis Hartz in the mid-twentieth century, claims that 
American civic ideals are homogenous. According to this school of thought, there is one common culture, 
understood by all Americans, which is liberal by nature and has been the dominant ideology since the nation’s 
founding. The legacy of this liberalism results in a “color-blind” society that extends common human rights 
to everyone. As with traditional liberal doctrine, there are no specific requirements to receive equal treatment 
under the law, whether it be state-sanctioned or natural. At the community level, all humans are equal, and at the 
individual level, all humans treat each other as equals. 
From this point of departure, it is easy to conclude that all voices expressed in the “public life” should be 
considered equally. If all humans are equal to each other and all humans universally respect each other equally, then 
all voices should be heard and considered equally by everyone. But, this is simply not the case. The Tocquevillian 
account of “American Exceptionalism” might have been true amongst a small group of Americans (white men), 
but it did not extend to include everyone within its influence. So, can there be a commonly understood “democratic 
culture” in a society that is not egalitarian?
The United States and American culture was, and continues to be, far from equal. The fantasy of universal 
liberal treatment of all within America eludes most. America, a nation built on the backs of African slaves, 
would not have been prosperous enough to finance a secessional revolution from an empire that treated the white 
colonists as sub-citizens. Even as George Washington led ragtag militias in defense of Thomas Jefferson’s famous 
claim that “all men are created equal,” both men held hundreds of African slaves in shackles at their Virginia 
plantations. Neither men freed their slaves after America’s victory.
Illiberal treatment of individuals within America’s reach extended far beyond African slaves. The forced 
removal of Native Americans from their ancestral lands demonstrates another instance of unequal treatment. 
Deadly relocation efforts and horrendous living conditions on the reservations nearly wiped out Native Americans 
on genocidal levels. “Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness” did not, and continues to not, apply to them. 
Asian Americans are another group subjected to illiberal America. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 
and Japanese Internment during World War II demonstrate how many white Americans did not want to give 
Asians the ability to access membership in liberal America. Many white Americans today want to keep Asian 
Americans from gaining full membership in liberal America by “othering” Asian Americans based upon their 
cultural differences, whether real or perceived.
Women have also been excluded from liberal America. Considered property of their husbands through 
most of the nineteenth century, women were and continue to be second class citizens to their (white) male 
counterparts. While American women have made great strides in recent history, women continue to be subject to 
illiberal America, only earning 81 cents to the dollar their male colleagues make for doing the same job, as well 
as colliding into glass ceilings in many industries and in politics.
Today, illiberal America continues to affect varying identities within its reach. Black Americans continue 
to face systemic racism that is embedded within the fabric of America. From the lasting consequences of redlining 
to mass incarceration caused by the “War on Drugs,” Black Americans are still excluded from liberal America.
Like Black Americans, Latinx Americans are also barred from liberal America. Aside from the racism 
and bigotry that Latinx Americans face today, non-citizen Latinx Americans who are in the United States for 
work do not experience the same general welfare as citizens. America has decided not to give non-citizen Latinx 
Americans universal human rights that citizens of the United States enjoy, which is contrary to liberal doctrine. 
 1    Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. by J.P. Mayer (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1969), 131.
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Liberal America, a nation that is blind to membership, would treat all humans equally as long as they are within 
her borders. This is not the case with Latinx Americans.
Illiberal America also affects Americans with identities that may not necessarily be visible, such as those 
in the LGBTQ+ community. Until recently, matters concerning this community were scarcely discussed because 
members identifying as LGBTQ+ were considered deviant from the American norm, and thus unimportant, or 
even worse: threatening. This has changed in the past decade and a half as the LGBTQ+ community has made 
enormous strides towards equality. But, equal treatment in America for the LGBTQ+ community is far from sight 
considering legislation like the North Carolina Bathroom Bill and continued animus toward this community.
As we can see with the examples above that are far from exhaustive (pardon the exclusion of religious 
persecution; the list is far too long), America is not monolithically liberal. America does not afford universal rights 
to all within its influence. The Enlightenment liberal dream that all can enjoy “life, liberty, and property,”2 that all 
will morally “act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in any other person, always 
at the same time as an end, never merely as a means”3 does not exist in America. The Tocquevillian assessment of 
an egalitarian society that results from a democratic system only applies to a select few white men. 
As outlined above, most Americans are subject to illiberal America. In Civic Ideals, Rogers Smith states, 
“relative egalitarianism that prevailed among white men (at first, moderately propertied white men) was surrounded 
by an array of fixed, ascriptive hierarchies, all largely unchallenged by the leading American revolutionaries.”4 
In other words, white propertied men that had power in the colonial period created a lower class that consisted of 
women, Black slaves, and Native Americans. Each of these groups had their own distinct position in the underclass 
and each group’s experience in illiberal America is unique. Regardless, illiberal America was established as a way 
for liberal (white) America to prosper because liberal America needs illiberal America for its survival. The result 
is a coexistence between liberal and illiberal America. 
Tocqueville was wrong in his assessment that democracy destroys inequalities. Inequalities in America 
existed far before democracy was established and they continue to this day. The universal human respect that 
seems to be necessary for a democratic culture that accepts expressions of all voices does not exist in America. 
Membership requirements in the American polity extend far beyond basic personhood. Instead of simply being 
a rational actor, as would be required in a purely liberal society, American civic membership requires a certain 
identity to participate.
In an America that blends liberal and illiberal ideals, is it possible to have a common conception of 
“democratic culture,” the shared understanding amongst most individuals in America (“culture”) about participation 
in the civic community (“democratic”)? Rogers Smith correctly points out that the egalitarian society that would 
be accepting of expression of all voices in the public civic community does not exist. He is right in the sense that 
certain voices have been prioritized and continue to be prioritized over others in the American polity. However, 
regardless of the individual values each has, we would be hard-pressed to find someone in America that does 
not believe others, especially the government, should listen to their own voice. American democratic culture is 
the common understanding that as an American, the government should respond to my voice.5 Whether one is a 
klansmember or a feminist, each believes that their government should respond to their individual needs. While 
a klansmember and a feminist have very different conceptions of who the government should respond to (i.e. a 
klansmember would think that the government should only listen to white people while a feminist would want 
the government to respond to men and women equally), both Americans believe the government should respond 
to someone, especially the individual expressing her or his own voice. Expression of voice and government 
responsiveness may not be egalitarian for some, but each individual believes the government should listen and 
 2     John Locke, “Second Treatise of Government,” in Political Philosophy: The Essential Texts, ed. Steven M. Cahn, 3rd. ed. 
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 366.
 3    Immanuel Kant, “Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals,” in Cahn, Political Philosophy, 518.
 4    Rogers Smith, Civic Ideals (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 17.
 5    When I mention the term “American,” I do not necessarily mean a “citizen” of the United States. I will use the term 
American to describe all within the jurisdiction of the United States, not just legal citizens. All legal citizens of the United States are 
Americans, but not all Americans are legal citizens of the United States. I will use the term “citizen” to describe legal citizens in the 
United States, while I will use the term American for all that are within the reach of American influence.
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respond to her or him personally.
The first section of this thesis will be an intense analysis of Rogers Smith’s work, Civic Ideals. As mentioned 
before, this text is a hard critique of the Tocquevillian-Hartz doctrine of a dominant liberal culture in America. 
Smith writes, “Liberal notions of natural rights as expounded in the Declaration of Independence and writings 
of philosophers like Locke make a prima facie case that all those capable of developing powers of rational self-
guidance should be treated as bearers of fairly robust individual rights.” Instead, many Americans have “wished to 
maintain white supremacy, to preserve old gender roles, to uphold Protestantism in public life, and in other ways 
to resist many egalitarian demands in liberal and democratic ideologies.”6 Smith clearly proves that America is not 
monolithically liberal, that “Americanism” has major illiberal elements. He says, “American politics is best seen 
as expressing the interaction of multiple political traditions, including liberalism, republicanism, and ascriptive 
[racial, sexist, etc.] forms of Americanism, which have collectively comprised American political culture, without 
any constituting it as a whole.”7 Smith’s “Multiple Traditions Theory” shows us that “Americanism” is the mixing 
of liberal and illiberal ideals. At times, these ideals are more liberal, and at times these ideals are more illiberal. He 
demonstrates this through an analysis of U.S. citizenship laws by breaking down who is able to gain membership 
into liberal America, which, as mentioned earlier, is very exclusive.
Smith discusses how these traditions are manufactured. He claims, “political leaders need compelling 
stories to convince their constituents… that they are one people, and, second, that they are a people well served by 
following those rulers.”8 These stories are what Smith calls “civic myths,” which are stories “used to explain why 
persons form a people, usually indicating how a political community originated, who is eligible for membership, 
who is not and why, and what the community’s values and aims are.”9 Similar to Plato’s “Myth of the Metals,” 
these stories do not have to be based on any particular facts. The only requirement is the people need to believe 
in them. These stories are created by politicians to maintain the status quo and to embolden those who are at the 
top of the American hierarchy.
It makes sense that citizens of the United States would want to be a part of a narrative of excellence. 
The “colorblindness” of liberalism that rejects narratives of certain identities is far from empowering. Smith 
notes that “most U.S. citizens seem to have wished to hear that their peoplehood was more deeply rooted, and 
of more intrinsic importance.”10 This creates a distinction between those with membership and those without, 
giving the individual a sense of value. Smith writes, “It is thus unsurprising that many Americans have been 
attracted to ascriptive civic myths assuring them that, regardless of their personal achievements or economic 
status, their inborn characteristics make them part of a special community.”11 Through their perceived shared 
culture, individuals feel “distinctively and permanently worthy.”12 Those with membership to liberal America 
subscribe to these civic myths as a way to feel special and superior. The creation of membership to gain access to 
liberal America is a performative contradiction in itself. Regardless, an exclusive membership has been created 
for a select few to gain access to egalitarian, liberal America.13 All those without membership do not have access 
to liberal America.
Smith’s scathing critique of a homogenous liberal America is very important to note. The basic cultural 
elements of equality that are presumably needed for a functioning democracy are not evident in America. How 
could there possibly be a democratic culture in America without the egalitarian values that liberalism professes? 
At a systemic level, Smith is right to point out these flaws within American culture.
But what about at the individual level? Is there a democratic drive within each of us? This is where Smith’s 
analysis falls short. He proves that the values and ideals of Americans can be illiberal, but he does not fully analyze 
 6    Smith, Civic Ideals, 36-37.
 7    Ibid., 5.
 8    Ibid., 32.
 9    Ibid., 33.
 10    Ibid., 38.
 11    Ibid.
 12    Ibid.
 13    Even though citizenship to the United States has been extended to far more people today, equal access to liberal America 
continues to be a struggle for many Americans. Even if we assume that citizenship is granted equally to all who wish to receive 
it (which it is not, but this is beyond the scope of this essay), there are many people with citizenship who are barred from liberal 
America.
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the qualities of the actors within American culture. Smith considers the intertwining of liberalism and illiberalism 
in America as an attempt by the political elite to fill the empty space that Lockean liberalism leaves for political 
gain, but he does not explain how the individual actor sees himself or herself in the American civic community. 
While it is true that politicians have mixed liberal and illiberal ideals, this does not tell the entire story.
To explain how the individual sees herself in the American civic community, we will turn to Jurgen 
Habermas. According to Habermas, the non-liberal aspects of the American civic community are not entirely 
based upon a narrative pushed by the politically connected. Instead, he argues that while non-liberal and liberal 
ideals are born separately, their fusion together in contemporary political theory is necessary for the survival of 
liberalism. This may seem counterintuitive at first. How can liberalism need non-liberal ideals for its preservation? 
It makes sense when democracy is properly classified as a “republican,” or non-liberal, ideal.
Popular sovereignty, the right of “communication and participation that secure the public autonomy of 
citizens,” is at the heart of democracy.14 But, popular sovereignty itself is not a liberal concept and it pre-dates 
liberalism by thousands of years. Habermas describes popular sovereignty as a “republican” concept, where the 
rights of the members “owed their legitimacy to the ethical self-understanding and sovereign self-determination 
achieved by a political community.”15 In other words, the rights of the individuals within the political community are 
determined by what the people in that community think is appropriate. Liberalism, on the other hand, specifically 
Lockean liberalism, understands the rights of the individual as transcending, intrinsic, and inalienable. Simply 
put, all individuals are in possession of equal rights that cannot be taken away. Liberalism and republicanism are 
at odds with each other, but they exist together in the American political community. In order to establish the 
rights of the individual (private “liberal” rights), the individual must participate in the civic community (public 
“republican” rights). But, to participate in the public civic community, the individual must possess the right to do 
so. This is why Habermas concludes that republicanism and liberalism “mutually presuppose each other in such a 
way that neither human rights nor popular sovereignty can claim primacy over its counterpart.”16
While Smith is not wrong to claim that the mix of liberal and illiberal ideals is a political creation, this 
does not entirely explain the interaction of liberal and non-liberal ideals in the American civic community. 
Americans understand themselves as rights-bearing individuals in the private life, individuals who are free to 
pursue what they believe is appropriate for themselves. When this is restricted, individuals in the American civic 
community believe that their own personal voice should be heard and considered as a rights-bearing person. 
While this concept might be an “American Tradition” that derives itself from civic myths created by politicians, 
the interaction between the public and private person within each individual is essential and common amongst 
Americans. In order for the individual to secure her personal, private rights, she must participate in the public 
civic community. This is why Americans with vastly different civic ideals believe that their own personal voice 
should be heard and considered. Not all Americans believe that other voices should be heard equally to their own; 
rather, most Americans believe their own voices, and the voices of their advocates, should be heard and should 
receive a response from others, especially from the government.
Americans share a common procedural conception of “democratic culture” at the individual level. While 
there are different conceptions of who should speak and who should be heard, there is a common understanding 
that “my” voice should be heard. Americans “exercise their civic autonomy in order to specify clearly which 
interests and standards are justified,” as Habermas explains.17 This is exemplified through the Tea Party, Indivisible, 
and Black Lives Matter movements today. In the past, we see this with the Chicano/a and Black Civil Rights 
movements of the 1960s and the Seneca Falls Convention that happened more than 100 years earlier. It is American 
to actively want to voice needs and desires with the intent of being heard and responded to. To demonstrate that 
even Americans with the most illiberal ideals believe that their voice should be heard, I will wrap up this essay by 
analyzing a campaign speech made by former Ku Klux Klan Grand Wizard David Duke.
Section One: On Liberalism and American Civic Ideals
 14    Jurgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), 258.
 15    Ibid.
 16    Ibid., 261.
 17    Ibid., 265.
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Philosophical Foundations of American Liberalism
According to Louis Hartz, the grand “American Experiment” is rooted in Enlightenment liberal thought. In The 
Liberal Tradition in America, Hartz claims, “a society which begins with Locke, and thus transforms him, stays 
with Locke, by virtue of an absolute and irrational attachment it develops for him.”18 In other words, America, 
which Hartz claims is rooted in Locke, will dogmatically support his doctrine. Support for Lockean liberal thought 
is exemplified by the fact that 91% of Americans at least somewhat agree with the statement that they are proud 
of their constitution, while a staggering 71% of Americans strongly agree with that statement.19 With such wild 
support for Lockean institutions, it is important to understand what exactly Lockean thought is. 
The concept that all “men” are equally given “unalienable Rights,” which consist of “Life, Liberty, and the 
Pursuit of Happiness,” is derived from Lockean thought. Jefferson uses Lockean thought to outline what rights 
are naturally given to “men” that are prior to any established government. These rights cannot be taken away by 
governments because governments are “instituted among men” who already have natural rights, giving “men” 
the power to “dissolve all political ties” from a government that restricts those rights. Not only should we look at 
where Locke finds natural rights, but we should also consider how he finds them.
In Chapter II of the Second Treatise of Government, Locke asks us to imagine a world without politics. 
Locke writes, “To understand political power, right, and derive its original, we must consider what state all men 
are naturally in.”20 He asks the reader to think of “a state of perfect freedom… [a] state also of equality.”21 In 
other words, Locke wants us to disembody ourselves from our current situation and think of a state of being with 
no government. This hypothetical situation is the “State of Nature,” what the human experience would be like 
prior to government establishment. The “State of Nature” is not lawless; there is the “law of nature to govern it, 
which obliges every one: And reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all 
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions.”22 In other words, 
because all “men” are equal within the “State of Nature,” no person is allowed to deprive  another of his basic 
existence, which is life in a state of complete freedom. Any restriction of these equally endowed rights is against 
“man’s” nature.
From the “State of Nature,” “men” came together as equal agents to establish governments to protect 
their natural rights. As Locke explains, “in his own judgment, it was not good for [man] to be alone, putting him 
under strong obligations of necessity, convenience and inclination, to drive him into society.”23 In the interest of 
preserving the natural rights of man, “the community comes to be umpire by settled standing rules, indifferent, 
and the same to all parties.”24 In other words, men give up certain freedoms, like the ability to punish their injurers, 
by agreeing to certain standards within society. This is the formation of the “Social Contract”; when “any number 
of men have, by the consent of every individual, made a community, they have thereby made that community 
one body, with the power to act as one body.”25 Unanimous consent within the political body is necessary when 
establishing and maintaining the “Social Contract.” Members within a society must agree to rules that could 
possibly restrict their natural rights; otherwise, natural rights found in the “State of Nature” must not be restricted.
In Locke’s liberalism, the natural rights of all humans, the rights that make all humans equal, are not 
given to them by government. Rather, these rights are the by-products of the conditions found within the “State 
of Nature.” This makes natural rights pre-political: rights that governments cannot take away unless all within a 
governing polity consent to restrict those rights. The philosophy behind Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence 
clearly follows this logic. As Britain restricted certain property rights through forms of legislation–most famously, 
taxation without the colonist’s representation (consent) in Parliament–Jefferson used Lockean language to describe 
 18    Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1955), 6.
 19    Robert Dahl, How Democratic Is The American Constitution? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001), 36.
 20    Locke, “Second Treatise of Government,” 365.
 21    Ibid.
 22    Ibid., 366.
 23    Ibid., 374.
 24    Ibid.
 25    Ibid., 376.
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the unjust actions of the British government. For Jefferson, the purpose of government is the protection of these 
pre-political rights, the natural rights of humans found in the “State of Nature.” Government is not supposed to 
pick winners and losers by determining what is the proper way to live to reach a certain end; in other words, the 
government is not meant to endorse one particular interpretation of the “good life.” Instead, government is meant 
to be an “umpire,” a passive figure that only intervenes when an individual’s rights are infringed upon by another. 
Lockean liberal government is meant to endorse pluralism and coexistence of multiple ways of life, so long as 
they do not infringe upon another individual’s rights. However, the government created in America does not do 
this for all Americans. We can trace some of the problems we face back to Locke’s point of departure.
The issue with Locke’s philosophical point of origin is evident in the work of other liberal thinkers. The 
contemporary political theorist John Rawls has a similar starting point to Locke. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
lays out “principles of justice for the basic structure of society… [a] conception of justice which generalizes and 
carries to a higher level of abstraction.”26 Rawls’ theory is not meant to outline one specific conception of the 
good. Rather, it is meant to act as  guidance for “free and rational persons” to define their “fundamental terms of 
association” without bias.27 To do so, Rawls creates the epistemic starting point of the “Original Position,” where 
the individual does not know their own position within society. This is done by putting the self “behind the veil 
of ignorance,” where the individual does not know “their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate 
principles solely on the basis of general considerations.”28 In other words, Rawls asks the reader to remove the self 
from its current situation by removing all particularities that give the individual self its identity. Rawls’ “Original 
Position” is similar to Locke’s “State of Nature” in this way, which Michael Sandel argues is quite problematic. 
Sandel critiques Rawls’ assumption that humans are “unencumbered selves,” individuals who are entirely 
“free and rational beings” who can pick and choose all aspects of their identity. Sandel argues that individuals 
cannot disembody from their selves by shedding away all that creates their identity. He asks whether “we can 
view ourselves as independent selves, independent in the sense that our identity is never tied to our aims and 
attachments?”29 In response to this question, Sandel writes, “I do not think we can, at least not without cost to 
those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable 
from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are–as members of this family or community or nation 
or people, as bearers of that history, as citizens of this republic.”30 The individual’s identity and how the individual 
understands the “self” is locked within the individual’s situation. What is happening around the individual will 
influence their moral decisions, even when the individual tries to remove herself from her surroundings. 
Like Rawls, Locke requires the reader to partake in a thought experiment in which the individual must 
disembody himself from his current situation to see what rights are found in “nature.” This is not possible, which 
we can see when we analyze Locke’s interpretation of the “State of Nature.” Locke’s understanding of the “State 
of Nature” is rooted in the societal norms of his time, which is exemplified by placing the “man” as the primary 
unit of analysis.31 In other words, Locke asks us to imagine a world before society was created, yet when Locke 
does so himself, he incorporates socially constructed gender hierarchies into his description of a pre-political 
world. An individual cannot separate herself from her own identity to find the abstract point of view needed to 
determine what is “natural.” Locke’s identity, which is deeply rooted in his time and place, demonstrates that there 
is no “unencumbered self” that can detach himself from his current situation. 
So, in a hypothetical situation like the “State of Nature” or Rawls’ “Original Position,” there is a normative 
element to the outcome of the hypothetical that is based upon the societal norms the actor is within. This is 
important to note because the natural rights that liberal governments are created to promote and defend are not 
natural at all and are biased towards certain parties, like propertied men in Locke’s liberalism. So, liberalism–
specifically liberalism in America–does in fact push a certain normative framework, or a certain idea of the “good 
life.” This is contradictory to the understood purpose of liberal thought, the concept of transcending human rights 
that all hold in common, which governments are meant to protect without interference in an individual’s pursuit 
 26    John Rawls, “A Theory of Justice,” in Cahn, Political Philosophy, 917.
 27    Ibid.
 28    Ibid., 927.
 29    Michael Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,” Political Theory 12, no. 1 (1984): 90.
 30    Ibid.
 31    John Locke, “Second Treatise of Government,” 365.
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of their purpose. For Locke, this is only true amongst propertied men, who, in his time, were primarily white.
American Civic Ideals
In the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson asserts, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all 
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these 
are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”32 The foundations of America began with these liberal words, 
that basic rights transcend all humans no matter their membership in society. But, American civic ideals are not 
purely liberal. Many illiberal institutions and norms (like Jim Crow laws and Japanese internment, to name only 
a couple) have been a part of American civic history. Rogers Smith discusses this American phenomenon in his 
book, Civic Ideals. Smith argues that the American civic community does not have monolithically liberal ideals; 
rather, “Americanism” is a mix of “Civic Traditions” that are made up of liberal, republican, and ascriptive 
(illiberal) ideals.
Before we begin to analyze Smith’s work, I would like to define the rather broad and ambiguous term, 
“civic community.” Smith frequently uses this term when discussing his analysis of American civic ideals, yet 
he does not explicitly define it himself. Since the American civic community will be a focal point of my essay, I 
will infer what I believe he means and add elements that I believe are important. At the beginning of chapter 1, 
Smith defines and discusses what he means by the term “citizen.” Smith states, “The word citizen derives from 
the ancient Greek and Roman city-states, and, as Aristotle famously argued, in its strict sense it originally referred 
only to those men who had some share in the political life of their polis, not to all who lived there.”33 In other 
words, a “citizen” is an individual who has membership in a group of other individuals that participate in the 
political workings of the state. Not everyone has access to membership into the civic community, like in ancient 
Athens, where “slaves, resident aliens, and women were not true citizens” and could not participate in the political 
life.34 Membership in the civic community does not exactly mean legal citizenship as outlined by American law. 
Rather, membership in the civic community is given to those who are allowed to participate in the discussions that 
determine the laws and practices of the state. I acknowledge that this definition of the “civic community” remains 
broad. This is intentional due to the wide range of ways individuals can participate and interact in the civic 
community, as well as the many ways the civic community can impact the lives of the individuals within the state, 
whether they are members of the civic community or if they are barred from it. As we now turn to Smith’s analysis 
of the ideals within the civic community, or what Smith calls, “civic ideals,” keep in mind that participation in 
the civic community is not limited to formally established institutions that are outlined in the Constitution of the 
United States, like voting. Participation in the civic community can be informal, like protesting in the streets or 
composing politically motivated music. Political voice can be added to the civic community’s discussion in many 
different ways, giving the individual a wide variety of options to have their needs and wants heard and considered.
 We begin with Smith’s critique of Hartz who “saw conflicts in American history, but they were in his 
view all conflicts within liberal boundaries.”35 “They believe that the cause of human equality,” Smith writes 
of Hartzian Americanists, “is best served by reading egalitarian principles as America’s true principles, while 
treating the massive inequalities in American life as products of prejudice, not rival principles.”36 Smith further 
clarifies this strand of political thought: “democratic commitments [are] the culture’s core values… with ‘severe 
but episodic exceptions,’ tolerance has been the American ‘cultural norm.’”37 Except for infrequent aberrations 
throughout American history, Hartzian scholars argue that Americans uphold their liberal civic ideals. “Racism 
appears only as white self-interest,” Smith writes of the Hartzian school of thought, “not as one of America’s 
constitutive, fundamental ideological components.”38
The Hartzian assessment of the American civic community would classify institutions like slavery as 
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aspects of America that did not fit properly into the American narrative and “had to be eliminated.”39 The dominant 
liberal ideals of Americans would not allow a practice like slavery to continue. Smith disagrees with the Hartzian 
assessment that illiberal aspects of American society should be reduced to mere “episodes” of illiberalness. 
This does not properly explain why America would have such anti-liberal aspects within its civic community 
throughout its history. American civic ideals must have had elements within them that would support such illiberal 
practices, but these elements did not originate from liberalism like some scholars believe.
Smith also argues against the claim that the illiberalness of America is a result of liberalism. “[I]nequalities 
are held to be inherent in the liberal ideas,” Smith writes of this school of thought, “as well as liberal social and 
economic institutions that are still said to form the core of American life.”40 In other words, the legacy of Lockean 
liberalism carries with it racism and prejudice that are at the core of this philosophy and cannot be separated from 
it. Egalitarian values espoused by liberal thought are, and can only be, supported by the exploitation of those who 
are not a part of the civic community, or as many enlightenment liberal thinkers suggested, were not capable of 
being part of the liberal community. This means that embracing liberal ideals will result in illiberal practices that 
seem contradictory to liberalism itself.
This may seem like a good explanation for the illiberalness of American civic values. If liberal America is 
rooted in Lockean thought, the contradictions would make sense! Locke derives his natural rights of an egalitarian 
society from its foundations of the “State of Nature” where “all are in a state of equality,” unless if you are a 
woman or a person of color. Locke’s liberal thought is rooted in illiberal conceptions of the world, which would 
make his philosophy prejudiced. Therefore, the bigoted actions of some in America are within the bounds of 
Lockean liberalism. But, Smith does not buy this argument. Instead, he sees both liberal America and illiberal 
America as “intertwined but relatively autonomous systems of ideas and practices,” or in other words, America 
has a unique fusion of liberal and illiberal civic ideals.41 It is not liberalism that causes illiberal things to happen. 
Liberalism, especially Locke’s liberalism, leaves space for illiberal ideals to be included due to the inherent 
vagueness of liberalism’s aim.
From his philosophical point of departure, the “State of Nature,” Locke allows the reader to fill in the 
blanks of who is actually considered “rights bearing,” or, in other words, completely human. Locke vaguely argues, 
“God gave the world to men in common… he gave it to the use of the industrious and rational.”42 For Locke, 
this excludes women and people of color from being “rights bearing” individuals because they lack “reasoning” 
capabilities; thus, they are not entirely equal. He most likely disqualifies these groups of people because he is 
an embedded individual within his societal time and place. So, this leaves the question for future generations of 
readers of Locke to determine who qualifies as a bearer of natural rights. On the grounds that all are “equal in the 
State of Nature,” who is included in the “all”? Is it just those who qualify as “industrious and rational,” or do these 
rights extend to more individuals?
When Thomas Jefferson used Lockean thought as a template for the Declaration of Independence, he 
wrote that “all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights.”43 
Yes, Thomas Jefferson believed that all men were created equal, but one must first qualify to be a “man” to be 
equal. For example, men of African descent were not included in Jefferson’s proclamation, but his reasoning for 
leaving African slaves out was not the same as Locke’s. Jefferson faced political pressures to unite the colonies 
against the British crown and needed to make concessions for the south. Jefferson excluded Black men from “all 
men” for political reasons, while he and the rest of the white colonists (the “all”) fought against a government 
that restricted their “natural rights.” We can see in this instance liberalism working together with illiberalism. 
This example shows us that liberalism does not create illiberalism, rather liberalism leaves room for illiberalism. 
Politicians and the politically-connected fill this space with what Smith calls the “civic myth.”
Similar to Plato’s “Myth of the Metals,” also known as the “Noble Lie,” the “civic myth” is a tool used to 
create unity amongst a certain people. Smith describes it as “a myth used to explain why persons form a people, 
usually indicati[ng] how a political community originated, who is eligible for membership, who is not and why, 
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and what the community’s values and aims are.”44 A narrative that connects a people together is needed in a 
nation like the United States that has “many people whose political history, religious or political beliefs, ethnicity, 
language, or other traits” differ.45 Thus, a civic myth can be used to unify a diverse group of people that live within 
the state’s boundaries by binding liberal, non-liberal, and/or illiberal civic ideals together. 
A civic myth can also be used to unite one group within the diverse populace to separate itself from the 
rest within the state. Smith says, “Leaders are therefore likely to invoke any and all preexisting senses of common 
identity they can that will also support their own rule, such as widely shared languages, ancestries, cultural 
customs, religion, suitable doctrines of ‘natural’ group identity, and histories of oppression (as either conquered 
or conquerors).” 46 Leaders will use a common identity amongst a group of people to form a community within 
the larger community. Within the smaller community, there may be liberal principles of equality, but not all have 
access to membership within this community if they do not share in the common identity. 
What unites this community does not have to be real; the story only needs to be convincing. Smith 
articulates, “As Plato suggested long ago, the stories of civic identity fostered by political elites are virtually 
always false or at least highly dubious.”47 A false narrative might be more compelling and stronger than a narrative 
of truth. Tales that embellish heroes that succeeded in riveting events are stories people want to believe in, 
especially if that hero is their ancestor. This is important to remember as we turn now to look at the American civic 
myth. How does the American community bind itself together? Who is allowed to have membership within the 
American community? Does it choose a common identity that transcends all Americans, or one that is exclusive?
The American civic myth is rooted in Jefferson’s interpretation of Lockean liberalism. Smith explains, 
“the principles of liberal individual rights and democratic republicanism in America’s Revolution all made these 
traditions central resources for the creation of an American Civic Community.”48 The American civic myth 
promises “a free, peaceful, diverse yet tolerant, and prosperous community.”49 It gives the individual “personal 
independence from many repressive structures.”50 Finally, it ensures a “civic life that is expressive of one’s personal 
dignity, responsive to one’s concerns, and shared with sturdy, loyal peers.”51 These civic qualities derive from 
Jefferson’s justification of America’s independence from Great Britain, which is based on what Locke thought was 
the proper role of government. The principles that America was founded upon, that government should protect 
the “natural” rights of individuals, form the common culture that Americans share. How Americans conceive of 
the government protecting these rights differs. Some believe the government should be as hands-off as possible 
and should only mediate discrepancies between two private parties, while others believe the government should 
do what it can to enhance the rights of the individual. Regardless, Americans believe that the government should 
not impede these intrinsic rights that all humans share. This will encourage a vibrant civil society that will allow 
people who have differing interests and purposes to co-exist.
This is the civic myth Americans believe in, a myth that is not rooted in truth. “The liberalism of the 
Declaration of Independence,” Smith writes, “includes the unproved but sanctifying claim that men have 
individual rights ‘endowed by their Creator.’”52 As discussed earlier, Locke’s liberalism is built upon a flimsy 
foundation where rights are found in “nature,” a pre-political “state.” To avoid infinite regress, Locke uses the 
authority of God as a philosophical backstop to validate how humans obtain these rights in “nature”: “For men 
being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and wise Maker.”53 Jefferson continued Locke’s weak justification 
of “natural” individual rights as inalienable rights given to all by their “Creator.” Smith continues, “The claim of 
popular sovereignty—taken to imply that the people as a whole ever do engage or ever have engaged in extensive 
public deliberation on an egalitarian basis in order to resolve directly any concrete issue of public life—is also a 
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myth.”54 In other words, the American people and their collective will as equals have never and will never be a 
driving force of change. “Political decision making is in reality almost always more a matter of elite bargaining 
than public deliberation,” says Smith.55 He says that this is true even in cases when Americans do decide to 
participate in the political process.56 But, the vast majority of the time, the American public is disinterested in the 
political process as evinced by dismal turnout rates during elections. This leads Smith to conclude, “the liberal 
and republican traditions stressed in standard accounts of American political culture are themselves not simply 
rationalist political doctrines, but also civic myths.”57
Aside from the fact that the American civic myth is based upon falsehoods, Americans do not uphold the 
principles of the narrative. To ensure that the participation and practice of certain activities do not infringe upon 
the rights of others, liberalism can “militate against the claims of private religious, familial, and cultural groups, 
as well as personal conscientious choices.”58 Liberalism does not actively work against these things, but these 
entities may be undermined “to contribute to common civic endeavors,” like the freedom to practice one’s own 
religion, or the ability to love whomever one wants to love.59 It can be frustrating to witness something that one 
does not believe in or is staunchly against morally. This is why “many Americans have instead professed to feel 
more deeply obliged to such groups than to democratic public life.”60 Some Americans would rather “maintain 
white supremacy, to preserve old gender roles, to uphold Protestantism in public life, and in other ways resist 
many egalitarian demands in liberal and democratic ideologies.”61 The egalitarian liberal values that create the 
American civic myth transcend all within these sub-communities. But without membership, one is excluded 
from equal treatment. Membership within these sub-communities may also be based upon a “myth,” as well. 
Regardless, these communities give the individual a sense of worth that feels real enough to reject opposing ways 
of living and civic values that, in theory, would be inclusive to differing conceptions of the good life.
It is difficult to find individual personal worth within a liberal society. Smith explains that “[l]iberal 
morals demand that individuals show themselves to be industrious, rational, and self-reliant, usually via economic 
productivity.”62 America is a society that values the productivity of its members. So, Smith writes, “in times 
of economic distress, especially, many Americans have found it hard to meet those standards.”63 During these 
times of economic distress, we can see individuals move away from inclusive liberal values to exclusive illiberal 
practices. Whether it is blaming the Chinese for taking away good railroad jobs in the 1800s or blaming Mexican 
immigrants for “stealing the jobs” of hard-working Americans today, inclusive liberal values are put aside during 
times of economic strife. Instead of finding personal worth through economic production, individuals turn to 
communities that are exclusive based upon specific identities, like race, gender, or nation, to name a few. 
I am not necessarily suggesting that pride in identity is bad. For example, it is common and even 
empowering for individuals to become friends with those who have gone through similar lived experiences. This 
activity becomes illiberal when individuals put that identity ahead of the liberal political community that treats all 
identities equally. An example of this is biased hiring practices. Liberalism does not care what the individual does 
in their private life so long as it does not infringe upon the rights of others. Once the activities cross over from 
the private life to the public life while interacting with others is when it conflicts with liberal ideals. The favoring 
of specific identities within the American civic community is a common occurrence because Americans lack a 
collective civic identity beyond that of an inclusive liberal community that values productivity, which can make 
it difficult to unite in trying times.
But this is the point of liberalism; a liberal society will not, or at least should not, endorse any specific 
identity. Smith says, “liberal and democratic republican political ideals have offered few reasons why Americans 
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should see themselves as a distinct people.”64 These ideals lack distinguishing characteristics that give the American 
identity its worth and value. There have been examples in America’s past when many Americans came together in 
favor of a liberal and inclusive society, like in our nation’s founding against the British crown or in the abolition 
of slavery. But, as Smith points out, “the defenders of those causes argued positively for political institutions that 
they believed could and should be embraced by any people, not especially by Americans.”65 Revolution leading 
to divorce from tyranny and the eradication of the institution of slavery were not uniquely American causes. 
America certainly has its own unique history due to the certain circumstances that led to the fight for freedom and 
emancipation, but these were causes that were bigger than just America. 
“It is thus unsurprising,” Smith writes, “that many Americans have been attracted to ascriptive civic myths 
assuring them that, regardless of their personal achievements or economic status, their inborn characteristics 
make them part of a special community.”66 Civic myths that place the individual within a narrative of struggle 
and success of a specific community are powerful and give the individual a sense of purpose. Individuals can 
find their sense of worth from a vibrant history of excellence instead of obtaining it through endeavors and 
accomplishments that give the individual worth in liberal societies. These narratives “have often helped many in 
less powerful positions to feel part of a larger, more enduring whole of intrinsic worth that will still flourish after 
they have perished.”67 These individuals feel satisfied by continuing the mission of fulfilling their community’s 
prophesized destiny. The civic myth is a powerful tool that can empower and create unity amongst a group of 
people. This power has been abused in the past by those who wield it.
Political leaders and those at the top of “prevailing social arrangements” in America have used ascriptive 
civic myths to gain power and maintain the current social structures to stay in power. According to Smith, “[v]
arious political parties and factions have certainly mixed liberal, republican, and ascriptive conceptions” of the 
American civic myth.68 This is done “to gain political leverage against their opponents… [b]ecause inegalitarian 
ascriptive Americanist accounts of the nation’s civic identity thus can make being American seem natural, 
providentially favored, and a sign of superior worth.”69 It is politically expedient for people in power to use these 
civic myths that blend liberal ideals and illiberal ideals to gain and maintain power. As individuals try to find their 
own worth, those who have the power to create the American narrative abuse it for what they believe is good.
Liberal and illiberal America are manufactured by those who have the power to shape its narrative. In 
the space that Locke’s liberalism leaves for interpretation, those who are in the position to author the American 
civic myth create a narrative that serves their own conception of “the good.” They create rules and interpret laws 
in ways that help maintain the hierarchy that put them there, while also appealing to the sub-community they 
represent. In America, those who are in power have primarily been white, propertied men and America’s past has 
reflected the needs and wants of these individuals. As we look at the development of liberal and illiberal America, 
we can see laws and rules passed in order to maintain this power structure and their specific conception of the 
good life.
The Blending of Liberal and Illiberal Ideals in America
Smith finds “[i]t striking that Americans structure access to their civic identity via terminology and institutions 
that harken back to political systems their Revolution was meant to overthrow.”70 An example of terminology 
that Smith finds absurd is the “naturalization” of citizenship. In feudal states, “subjectship to the political ruler 
under whom one was born was believed to be natural–sanctioned by divine will and rationally discoverable 
natural law.”71 In other words, those who were born within the bounds of a certain kingdom would “naturally” 
become a member of that feudal state. It was common belief that feudal monarchies were given their authority 
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through “divine” powers and thus were “naturally” able to determine who had the right to membership within 
their community. This conception of membership was challenged by American revolutionists who held Lockean 
beliefs that all men held certain rights that were pre-political. An individual would not need to be “naturalized” 
within the bounds of America to hold these inalienable rights. Yet, as Smith points out, “most people still acquire 
American citizenship, implying allegiance to the United States government, not by their consent but through an 
accident of birth, as in feudal England.”72 Even those who obtain citizenship in ways other than birthright are still 
considered “naturalized.”73 Access to all the benefits that come with American membership is still determined 
by feudal standards. Equal rights are only given to those who have membership, which is difficult to obtain in 
America because it requires much more than mere consent to be governed. These illiberal means of obtaining 
membership into liberal America are, as Smith points out, contradictory and very problematic.
Smith points to citizenship laws as proof of an illiberal America. Instead of the Hartzian doctrine that 
defines the American civic community as the “readiness to embrace egalitarian, liberal, republican political 
values,” Smith suggests a “quick overview of American citizenship laws” will show us that this understanding of 
American membership does not “give due weight to inegalitarian legal provisions that have shaped the participants 
and the substance of American politics.”74 These illiberal aspects of the American civic community are not just 
surviving pieces of feudalism or from “prerevolutionary institutions” that survived the American transformation, 
as “naturalized” citizenship may suggest. As Smith points out, “feudalism did not include chattel slavery, race-
based immigration and naturalization restrictions, ineligibility of women and the foreign-born for the highest 
political offices, segregation.”75 Instead, much of illiberal America became a part of the civic community after the 
birth of liberal America.
Liberal America and illiberal America developed along with each other, leaning more liberal at times and 
more illiberal at other times. Smith explains that “American civic history has been far more serpentine.”76 Some 
periods brought “great eras of democratizing American civic reforms.”77 For example, Smith points to the “Civil 
War and Reconstruction epoch, and the civil rights era of the 1950s and 1960s.”78 Other periods brought about 
illiberal aspects of America, like in 1882 after the Chinese Exclusion Act barred Chinese immigration. Until 
this point, “The U.S. had no racial or ethnic restrictions on immigration.”79 Or in the early 1900s when most 
African-American men once again became disenfranchised after they had received the right to vote in the 1870s 
during reconstruction.80 These illiberal aspects of American civic history are not by-products of a pre-liberal 
America. Instead of viewing America as a nation that began with illiberal civic ideals that is slowly becoming 
more liberal, America is a nation that develops liberal ideals, while it concurrently creates and defends illiberal 
ideals. American civic history has experienced plenty of eras where liberalism was at the fore, but these eras have 
not been sustained. Instead, the course of liberalism in America ebbs and flows, with some periods that are liberal 
and some that are illiberal, occasionally even developing side by side.
This brief look at America’s past shows us the mixing of American civic ideals. Through the use of “civic 
myths,” America’s political elite were able to create narratives that pushed certain agendas for their benefit, 
resulting in the establishment of laws that created and maintained certain hierarchies. The political elite created 
the multiple traditions that are present in the American civic community and these traditions have come to life 
through legislation. But, does Smith’s analysis tell us the whole story? The next section will take a closer look at 
the individual in the American civic community and how the actor understands himself or herself within it. 
 72    Ibid.
 73    Ibid.
 74    Ibid., 15. 
 75    Ibid.
 76    Ibid., 16. 
 77    Ibid.
 78    Ibid. 
 79    Ibid.
 80    Ibid. 
14Democratic Culture in America
Section Two: On Democratic Culture
In Search of a Common Democratic Culture
Smith’s analysis of the intertwining of liberal and illiberal civic ideals is compelling. As he notes, “Most liberal 
democratic positions are less effective than ascriptive views of civic identity in fostering beliefs that a certain 
group is a distinctive and especially worthy ‘people.’”81 Liberalism alone lacks the empowerment that identity-
based illiberal civic ideals foster. Illiberal aspects of the American civic community give its actors worth while 
they exist in a society that is only meant to be an umpire of the rules. Americanism blends these illiberal ideals 
that a people has worth based upon its unique self-understanding with liberal ideals, creating a sense that “my” 
worth and rights cannot be infringed upon by others.
This is done intentionally through the use of “civic myths” created by politicians and those who hold 
power in the American political system in order to maintain their power. Civic myths are “crafted by elites to meet 
two basic political imperatives… First, aspirants to power require a population to lead that imagines itself to be 
a ‘people’; and, second, they need a people that imagines itself in ways that make leadership by those aspirations 
appropriate.”82 In other words, through the use of civic myths, tales that are primarily based upon falsehoods, 
politicians can create unity amongst a people by binding them with a manufactured commonality. The civic myth 
is the tool used by the politically powerful in America, used to unite and mobilize individuals that may have 
nothing in common except for their placement within a grand, yet false, narrative.
From this we can conclude that Smith understands the American civic identity, the civic culture that is 
shared amongst its members in the civic community, as a political creation. This culture did not organically grow 
and manifest itself in each American. Instead, it was crafted carefully and often deviously to unite individuals 
within the civic community, sometimes as a way to create solidarity amongst all members in the community, but 
more frequently as a way to pit one group against another group in an inegalitarian fashion to either establish or 
uphold power structures. American civic myths have empowered certain groups within the civic community to 
believe that their place within it is important. Depending on which civic myth we look at, the narrative may make 
certain individuals believe that their worth is greater than other individuals within the civic community who do 
not have a place in their story.
But, how exactly does the individual agent understand herself within the American civic community? 
Just because a civic narrative places Individual A as more important than Individual B does not necessarily mean 
that Individual B believes that narrative and takes it as truth. What role does the individual have in determining 
American civic ideals and the laws that are created from these values? There are institutions in the American 
political system that encourage participation, like frequent elections and free speech laws meant to protect political 
dialogue. But, do Americans want to participate within the democratic system? Or in other words, do Americans 
see themselves as democratic agents that want to engage in the civic community to produce laws that reflect 
their own values, or do the competing American civic ideals create disunity in how Americans see themselves as 
political participants? 
To answer these questions, we will turn to Jurgen Habermas. Instead of Smith’s conclusion that political 
elites create narratives that blend illiberal ideals with liberal ideals as a political tool, Habermas argues that 
modern liberalism requires a coexistence with non-liberal, or what he calls “republican,” ideals like popular 
sovereignty, which allows individuals to advocate for their basic rights in the private life through participation in 
the civic community. How each individual goes about advocating for their rights in the civic community differs, 
but each individual believes that their needs and desires should be heard and considered when they are voiced. 
The American Civic Community through Jurgen Habermas
Before we dive into this section, there are a few terms I would like to clarify and define. The first term I 
would like to define is “democratic culture.” An ambiguous term that could mean anything from the frequency 
with which Americans participate in elections to Americans identifying as democratic agents, this term is meant 
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to be broad and rather encompassing. To explain what “democratic culture” is, I will use Jurgen Habermas’ 
explanation of “popular sovereignty,” an intrinsic quality of democracy that can be simply broken down to rule 
(sovereignty) of the people (popular), as “democratic culture’s” foundation. Habermas describes, “The principle 
of popular sovereignty is expressed in rights of communication and participation that secure the public autonomy 
of citizens.”83 In other words, popular sovereignty is the involvement in the political system through voicing 
individual or collective needs and desires to the civic community as public persons. Simply put, the individual 
has a say in what the laws and norms will become. This does not mean that the members of the civic community 
directly decide what actually becomes law. We could define this as “direct democracy.” Instead, “democratic 
culture” is the desire to be a part of the lawmaking process when an individual believes they need to express their 
voice and be heard. This could mean directly deciding what becomes law, but it could also mean the desire to 
influence lawmakers of the civic community through communication of needs and wants. This is a democratic 
“culture” because it is a commonly shared concept amongst most Americans and it gives the individuals within 
the culture a shared identity. In Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Charles Taylor writes 
about identity as “a person’s understanding of who they are, of their fundamental defining characteristics as a 
human being.”84 Identity that derives from culture allows individuals to understand who they are and their role 
within a community. In this case, “democratic culture” creates the shared identity of most within the American 
civic community, which outlines the individual’s place within this specific space. The shared identity does not 
have to be reciprocal. In other words, Individual A does not have to believe that Individual B shares in the 
identity of a participant in the American civic community. What matters is that both individuals see themselves as 
participants, that their own voice has value and that their own needs and concerns should be heard and considered 
by the government.
There are many ways that Americans can express their political voice in the civic community. It can be 
done through formal means, like voting in elections or communicating with a lawmaker through phone calls or 
writing letters. Expressing political voice can also be articulated in informal ways, like protesting in the streets, 
writing politically motivated literature, or creating art and composing music that conveys a political message. 
These are all means of expressing voice in the civic community. 
Popular sovereignty, and in this analysis, “democratic culture,” falls under another term, “republicanism.” 
I will define and explain this term through Habermas as well. In chapter 10 of the Inclusion of the Other, “On 
the Internal Relation between Law and Democracy,” Habermas describes “republicanism” as “human rights 
owed their legitimacy to the ethical self-understanding and sovereign self-determination achieved by a political 
community.”85 Through democratic means of popular sovereignty, the people have a say in determining the 
outcome of the laws and the specific identity of the political community. Habermas writes, “Republicanism, which 
goes back to Aristotle and the political humanism of the Renaissance, has always given the public autonomy of 
citizens priority over the pre-political liberties of private persons.”86 Republicanism is an ancient concept that 
dates back to classical Athens, where members of a civic community were granted the ability to communicate and 
contribute to the outcome of decisions that are made in the public, political life. Individuals in the civic community 
were allowed to participate in the political discourse with very few restrictions for those who were considered 
members. Republicanism and popular sovereignty is frequently referred to as the “freedom of the ancients,” 
meaning that the ancients were free to participate in the decision-making processes in the civic community. What 
was determined by the rule of the people became law. 
Republicanism is the establishment of human rights through “sovereign self-determination.” Self-
determination republicanism creates the rights of the people in the civic community through popular sovereignty. In 
other words, those within the civic community secure their place in it by expressing their needs and desires. Those 
within the civic community must voice their opinions as a way to determine the trajectory that the community 
will take. The placement of the individual as an active participant within the civic realm gives the individual their 
personal worth. 
 83    Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other, 258.
 84    Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1994)
 85    Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other, 258.
 86    Ibid.
16Democratic Culture in America
Republicanism creates the rights of the people, while liberalism is meant to guard the intrinsic rights that 
all people inherently have. Habermas explains, “Liberalism, which goes back to John Locke, has invoked the 
dangers of tyrannical majorities and postulated the priority of human rights.”87 Classical liberals saw the dangers 
that resulted from mob rule of the people and wanted to establish rights that “were supposed to provide, from 
the very start, legitimate barriers that prevented the sovereign will of the people from encroaching on inviolable 
spheres of individual freedom.”88 In this analysis, republicanism’s popular sovereignty–and therefore democratic 
culture–is not an element of liberalism. Rather, liberalism is meant to defend individuals from republicanism and 
the rule of the people. Instead of defending the rights of individuals to participate in their civic community–that 
is, the unrestricted ability to communicate needs and wants in the public life–liberalism defends the private rights 
of the individual from the restrictive actions of an overreaching government seeking to interfere with private 
pursuits. Liberalism keeps individuals from forcing their normative ends onto others by not allowing discourse 
about private matters in the public civic community. But, how did we determine the norm that private matters 
should not be discussed in the public life in the first place?
Habermas begins to answer this question when he says, “classical liberties (self-determination as public 
persons) are co-original with political rights only if we state more precisely the thesis that human rights legally 
enable the citizens’ practice of self-determination.”89 In other words, the creation of the civic community that is 
driven by self-determination creates the civic community that has equal civic rights. “These rights, which are 
meant to guarantee everyone an equal opportunity to pursue his or her private conception of the good, have an 
intrinsic value, or at least they are not reducible to their instrumental value for democratic will-formation.”90 In 
other words, the equal rights within the civic community derive from the human rights of liberalism, but these 
rights are developed simultaneously with self-determination in the public life. Habermas calls for a balance that 
must be reached between the right for an individual to pursue his or her preferred ends in the private life and the 
opportunity the individual has to determine the direction and values that define the civic community.
We can see the liberal ideal of protecting intrinsic human rights and the republican ideal of self-
determination working simultaneously in Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence. He writes that “it becomes 
necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another [italics added 
for emphasis].”91 The “one people” of America has the power–that is, the sovereignty–to grant and take away 
the authority of a government if it no longer protects their basic human rights. Governments in classical liberal 
doctrine receive their power to rule from the individual people and from the people’s decision that they would be 
better off in some formation of a commonwealth. The people determine that this is the best option to ensure their 
rights are not violated. This demonstrates a paradox in Lockean liberalism that is also evident in the American 
situation; liberalism is a doctrine meant to defend the individual from “tyrannical majorities,” but a general will 
of the people is needed to determine when it is appropriate to separate from illiberal rule and establish liberal 
government. In this instance, Smith could argue that Jefferson’s mixing of liberalism and republicanism is a 
civic myth meant to empower the colonists by describing separation from Great Britain as “our (the colonists) 
revolution.” Habermas, on the other hand, argues that the two are inseparable.
Liberalism and republicanism work side by side and interact with each other. When describing the 
relationship between private and public autonomy, Habermas states, “in order to establish a legal code it is 
necessary to create the status of legal persons who [are] bearers of individual rights.”92 In other words, the people 
of a state must determine the basic laws of the state. This includes the laws of a liberal state. In government 
formation, the basic tenants of the state must be determined by the general will of the people. But, Habermas 
also points out that “without basic rights that secure the private autonomy of citizens there is also no medium for 
legally institutionalizing the conditions under which these citizens, as citizens of a state, can make use of their 
public autonomy.”93 Simply put, basic rights must be given to each member of the state to allow each individual 
 87    Ibid.
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to participate in the will formation. A basic right in this situation could be the right to vote. Proper will formation 
that takes account of all individuals in a state can only be established with rules and norms, like one person equals 
one vote. But, these basic rights cannot be established without a people determining them in the first place. “Thus 
private and public autonomy,” Habermas concludes, “mutually presuppose each other in such a way that neither 
human rights nor popular sovereignty can claim primacy over its counterpart.”94
Popular sovereignty and self-determination are integral parts of contemporary liberalism. When applying 
Lockean liberalism to a real situation, like Jefferson did, government does not form from the “State of Nature.” 
Assumptions that are made when establishing the “Social Contract” that creates government from the “State of 
Nature” are no longer applicable. In a contextualized situation, individuals are no longer completely autonomous 
beings. Individuals are embedded within their situation, whether the individual enjoys their specific profession, is 
part of a family, or is a member of a community, big or small. Individuals become attached to these aspects of their 
life and continue with them even if it is not rational to do so. An individual’s family, profession, or community 
gives identity and worth to the individual; these aspects of life are not present in the “State of Nature” thought 
experiment. The “State of Nature” is no longer relevant in state formation and in the initial establishment of laws 
when it takes place in a specific situation. There is no need to imagine how a government would be formed in a 
pre-political world if the situation is not in that time and place. This leaves massive space in Locke’s theory, which 
Jefferson and later contemporary theorists filled with republican values of self-determination. Republicanism is 
now an irreplaceable component of liberalism, born separately, but fused together when applied in context.
So, how does the fusion of self-determining will formation (democracy) with liberal conceptions of basic 
human rights play out in the American polity? We can find the answer to this question through Habermas: “This 
mutual presupposition expresses the intuition that, on the one hand, citizens can make adequate use of their public 
autonomy only if, on the basis of their equally protected private autonomy, they are sufficiently independent; but 
that, on the other hand, they can arrive at a consensual regulation of their private autonomy only if they make 
adequate use of their political autonomy as enfranchised citizens.”95 Here, Habermas formulates a balance that 
is needed in contemporary politics regarding basic principles of autonomy in a free society. On the one side, 
members of a civic community are only able to participate in the public life if they are protected equally as private 
persons with basic human rights, while on the other side, members of a civic community can only come to an 
agreement about what constitutes a basic right while participating in the public life. This means private persons 
must participate in the public civic community both to advocate for what can be done in the private life and to 
maintain their right to participate as public persons. 
There are many examples throughout American history of private persons coming into the public civic 
community to advocate for their rights in the private life, like the Black Civil Rights movement of the 1950s 
and 1960s, as well as the Women’s Suffrage movement. There are contemporary examples, as well, like the 
Black Lives Matter movement, the conservative Tea Party movement, and the Women’s March movement. And 
it would be wrong to exclude the demonstrations made by white supremacist movements across America, from 
Charlottesville, Virginia, to Laguna Beach, California. These movements have used many different tactics to 
participate in the public discourse from protesting in the streets to showing up to the polls in large numbers to 
vote on election days. The participation of these groups in the public civic community as advocates of their own 
conception of what is good in the private life maintains, and in certain cases like Women’s Suffrage, creates their 
right to be a participant in the public discourse.
Democratic Culture in America
The issues these groups listed above advocate for are vastly different, demonstrating the wide range of 
civic ideals within America. In contemporary America, there are groups participating in the same civic community 
fighting for an egalitarian America, while there are groups that want to maintain racial hierarchies that have been 
in the structure of American society since its founding. It is clear that American civic ideals are not uniform and 
they will most likely continue to differ into the future. So, without consent on common civic values, does this 
mean that Americans cannot share in a common democratic culture? While these groups have vastly different 
visions of what American society should look like, there is an important similarity between the groups: they all 
 94    Ibid.
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believe that their voice should be heard. Whether we look at the egalitarian feminist or the inegalitarian white 
supremacist, they both believe that their concerns should be considered. These groups want to practice self-
determination and want to decide the future trajectory of their nation by participating in the public discourse that 
allows them to voice their needs and wants.
To clarify, not all Americans who choose to voice their concerns in the American civic community believe 
that everybody should have an equal say in the public life. In fact, there are many Americans who believe that 
certain people within the United States should not be heard, or not be considered as much as the speaker’s own 
voice. Whether advocating to restrict the voices of others, or advocating for equal consideration of all voices, 
both actors believe that their own voice is valuable and should be considered. The person voicing his or her own 
opinion does not need to believe that all voices should be considered. All that matters to the individual voicing 
their own opinion is that their voice has worth and should be heard.
One would be hard-pressed to find an American who does not believe that their voice should be heard and 
considered when determining the future path of America. While there are no survey results that explicitly say that 
Americans want their voices to be heard by the government, nor are there any surveys that even ask the question 
in the first place, there are clues left behind in other survey data collections. In the 2016 General Social Survey 
(GSS), a section on “Political Efficacy” asked questions like, “Agree or disagree: I don’t think the government 
cares much what people like me think” and “Agree or disagree: People like me don’t have any say about what 
the government does.”96 Interestingly enough, almost half of respondents either agreed or strongly agreed to both 
of these statements. While these results might explain political apathy since almost half of Americans believe 
their government does not care about their needs and concerns, they also prove that Americans believe that the 
government should listen to and respond to the people, or at least listen to and respond to their own voice. These 
two questions and the rest of the survey are based upon the assumption that the government should listen to the 
people and that the people should be heard by the government when voicing their needs and concerns. Until an 
explicit survey question like “Should the government listen to me” or “Should my personal voice be heard and 
considered by the government” is asked, this assumption that the government should listen to “me” is interesting 
to consider. Now, we will turn to a concrete example of democratic culture in action by examining a person who 
holds values that most would say are quite undemocratic.
An Extreme Case of Democratic Culture: David Duke
To demonstrate that Americans want their voices heard and considered, we are going to examine a speech 
made on March 7, 1992 by David Duke in Plymouth, Massachusetts while he was running for President of the 
United States. David Duke, the former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan and a former representative in the 
Louisiana state legislature, is a well-known white supremacist. Clearly, Duke’s vision for America is far different 
than most mainstream candidates. He is worried about how the future generations of the “very same people that 
landed here in Plymouth will now find themselves as second class citizens in the nation they created.”97 Duke 
worries that white heritage in America is being overlooked by new and emerging cultures that had been oppressed 
in the past. He wants to reclaim “white greatness” and re-establish an America that puts white people first. He also 
discusses the problems our nation faces dealing with “homosexuals”98 “I think it makes sense to discourage that 
kind of behavior,” Duke says.99 “I miss the free country you can do what you want behind closed doors… What 
she or he is doing in their private dominion, I don’t care. But, I don’t want bad examples for my children and 
we’ve got to get some decorum in this country and some sense in this country.”100 Duke wants to maintain a nation 
that prevents individuals with differing sexual preferences from living their lives freely in public in the name 
of “decorum.” He wants to keep “homosexuals” from voicing their needs and desires in the civic community 
by restricting their actions to the private life. Duke is arguing to restrict the rights of participation for LGBTQ+ 
Americans in the public life and create a civic community that prioritizes the needs of white Americans over other 
 96    “2016 General Social Survey,” SDA: Survey Documentation and Analysis, April 6, 2017, https://sda.berkeley.edu/
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races. While Duke calls for very unequal and illiberal civic ideals that would exclude certain individuals from 
accessing the American civic community, he advocates for his own freedom to participate and voice his needs and 
desires in the public life.
At the beginning of his speech, Duke compliments his supporters and suggests that their effort “shows 
you that Americans will not stop fighting for their basic liberties and one of the liberties in this country is the 
right to run for office and the right to vote for the candidate of our choice.”101 In other words, Duke is drawing 
from the anger that he and his supporters feel about not having a representative in government to advocate for 
their positions. Duke and his supporters feel that their voices have been suppressed in the name of “political 
correctness” and that his supporters deserve a candidate who is not “politically correct but politically right” to 
represent their voices in the civic community.102 
Duke, who may not be telling the entire truth about the “right” to run for office (most forms of political 
office have age requirements and foreign-born citizens who are protected by the Bill of Rights do not have the 
right to run for President), he does make an important point about the feeling of right when discussing expression 
of needs and desires in the public life. It is not anyone’s right to run for and hold office in the United States–rather, 
it is a privilege to do so–but the way the American representative system is designed makes fringe groups feel 
as though their opinions are not heard when decisions are made regarding policy and the general direction of the 
country. Without a representative to advocate for their positions, those who support these positions do not feel like 
they have a voice in the American civic community. White supremacists and David Duke supporters can protest 
as much as their hearts desire, but they do not have a vote in the actual legislating procedure.
 This is why David Duke emphasizes the importance that he is on the ballot representing the needs and 
desires of the white supremacist community. His supporters, the people who are part of the white supremacist 
community, now have an option they can vote for that will put their community needs first. This community can 
directly vote for someone who will represent their needs and desires, giving them the ability to determine their 
own future. Duke expresses the relief that the white supremacist community feels now that they have an option 
and are not restricted to mainstream cadidates. Duke emphasizes self-determination, that his community deserves 
this opportunity to have their voices represented in the lawmaking process. He believes that his community has 
been suppressed for too long in the public life and that their voices deserve to be heard, even though their voices 
are demanding others be silenced. Duke believes that his voice and the voices in the community which he will 
represent have value, while other voices do not. 
The David Duke example is not a case of a radical appropriating words from mainstream groups in order to 
garner support. David Duke shows us that no matter what the individual believes in, like what the future trajectory 
of America should be or what constitutes the “good life,” Americans want their own voice heard and responded 
to by others, especially the government. The core concept of self-determination expressed by Duke can be used 
for different ends. Similar to David Duke, John C. Calhoun advocated for “the rule of concurrent majority” so 
the slaveholding south could have a greater voice in determining the future of America.103 In his article, “The 
Reassociation of Ideas and Purposes,” Stephen Skowronek points out that Lani Guinier, an American civil rights 
theorist, used the concept of “the rule of concurrent majority” to “maximize the political clout of former slaves.”104 
While the ends and values of John C. Calhoun and Lani Guinier differed immensely, they both believed that the 
minority in a certain political system should not have their voices silenced by the majority. In other words, they 
believed that the voices of the minority deserved to be heard and considered in the civic community.
So, no matter who the individual is and how the individual sees other people in the civic community, 
whether the others belong there or the others should have their voices restricted, the individual believes that their 
own personal voice has worth and should be considered. David Duke shows us that there can be competing civic 
ideals in America–for example, some individuals believe in egalitarian ideals while some individuals do not–yet 
all individuals believe that their needs and desires should be heard and considered. No matter what civic ideals 
the individual believes are right for the American civic community, the individual believes that their voice should 
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be listened to.
Concluding Thoughts
America has multiple civic traditions and is a nation that blends liberal and illiberal ideals. The Lockean liberal 
foundations the American civic community is built upon left space for people like Thomas Jefferson to add non-
liberal elements to Locke’s theory, so it could better fit the context of the situation. Rogers Smith argues that the 
political elite fill that space with illiberal values to obtain power or maintain already established power structures. 
The political elite create “civic myths,” tales that are made from falsehoods, that give the individuals of a certain 
community greater worth than individuals who do not share the community’s common identity. This can help 
politicians mobilize their base in times of economic hardship. Since Lockean liberalism gives individuals their 
worth based upon their productivity, individuals find their worth in sub-community identities, which politicians 
are not afraid to use for their own political gain.
The intertwining of liberal and illiberal ideals provoked by the political elite has seeped into the ideals 
of the average American. Members of the American civic community certainly have differing civic ideals, 
but Americans see themselves as both private persons and public members of the civic community. As Jurgen 
Habermas articulates, to have rights as a private person, basic rights that are defended by liberalism, the individual 
must voice their needs and wants as a public person in the civic community, exercising their ability to determine 
the trajectory of their civic community found in republicanism. In our contemporary world, liberalism and 
republicanism (a non-liberal ideal) coexist together. To obtain equal rights for all in the private life (liberalism), 
individuals must express their needs in the public life (republicanism). To reiterate, not all Americans believe 
that everyone should have equal rights in both the public life and the private life. Yet, in a civic community that 
has differing conceptions of who is allowed membership and who should be allowed to contribute to the public 
discourse, Americans believe one thing in common. Americans think that their own voice should be heard and 
considered when discussing matters in the civic community. Whether the individual is a Black Lives Matter 
advocate or David Duke, Americans believe that their voice is important and should be heard.
This study has created theoretical groundwork that can be expanded upon with empirical research. Given 
the limited time and resources of this study, I could not conduct and include surveys and interviews that would 
prove or disprove my theory. But, a future study could do so by simply asking the question, “Should the government 
listen to and consider my needs and concerns when I choose to voice them?”
This study was purposefully limited to the American situation because of its unique history and culture. In 
future studies, it would be interesting to look at the civic communities of other nations that have a vastly different 
situation to American society. It would be fascinating to compare the democratic culture of America to other 
nations after an in-depth analysis. 
Finally, another way to extend this study would be to consider the contradiction found in the American 
civic community. An actor who wants to keep certain members of the civic community from expressing their 
needs and desires while the actor expresses his needs and desires in the civic community is paradoxical and it 
would be interesting to inquire further about this contradiction.
The application of Habermas’ theory of the public and private person to the American situation allows us 
to look at the individual in a different way. Rather than merely considering the values the individual holds in the 
civic community, we can now consider the way the individual understands the self in the public life. There is not a 
clear universal civic ideal that all Americans understand as the “right,” while all discussions about the “good life” 
take place from that common ideal. But it is clear that most Americans understand their own place in the civic 
community and most Americans believe that their concerns are just as important, if not more important, than the 
person next to them. Instead of sharing common ideals, Americans share a common identity because Americans 
understand themselves as agents with concerns that are worthy enough to be heard. This is significant for theorists 
in search of a commonality between people who have fundamentally differing ideals within a certain situation and 
is significant for the average American looking to find harmony in society.
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